回馈授权的竞争法分析
陈 珊
（武汉大学法学院经济法学专业2005级硕士研究生）
中 文 摘 要
回馈授权，简称回授，是知识产权许可中的一种协议安排，它要求被许可方就其对许可使用技术所作的后续改进或通过使用标的技术所获得的新技术，应当向许可方报告、转让或授权。
既然回馈授权是许可协议中的一种安排，回授条款的产生与许可协议是密不可分的。有数据显示，43％的许可协议中包含有回馈授权条款，签订许可协议或发放许可证给许可人带来的利益和风险是回授条款出现的根本诱因。从许可人的角度来看，回馈授权产生的直接原因主要有两方面，一方面是逐利心理的驱动，另一方面是为了规避许可所带来的风险。
回馈授权行为能够产生有利于竞争的积极效果：回授可以使许可双方共同承担投资和创新的风险，补偿许可方进一步研究开发的投入，从而鼓励创新，促进创新市场的竞争及新技术的推广和传播。但是，如果回授条款实质上影响到被许可人或其他市场主体从事研究开发工作的积极性，不合理地削弱竞争对手的竞争力，甚至阻碍他人自由进入市场参与竞争，则会产生抑制竞争的负面效果。
司法实践中对于回馈授权的合法性问题讨论最多的是美国的Transparent-Wrap Machine Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co一案，通常简称为Transwrap案。这一案件不仅是回馈授权问题得到人们广泛关注的开始，该案的结论也成为此后对于回授进行评价、认定的基本依据和指导原则。回馈授权并不一定对市场经济造成危害，不应一概受到法律的禁止。对于回馈授权的法律规制应当限制在对于某一具体的回馈授权行为对现实的市场竞争所产生影响进行反托拉斯法的审查。
在美国的立法中，对于回授是分不同情形区别对待的：在许可合同中规定独占性回授或权利转让的条款，属于“本身违法”的情况；而非独占性的回授规定则属于“可能违法”的情形。欧共体内，《技术转让规章》对回授条款也是分别对待的：非独占性的互惠回授被列入“白色清单”，可以得到豁免；同时，非互惠、独占性回授被列入了“黑色清单”，不予集体豁免，以防止许可人获得对新技术的垄断性控制。与欧盟立法相似，非独占的、互惠的回授在日本被认为是合法的；对于独占性回授和非互惠的回授则必须通过类似美国合理性原则的全面衡量和具体分析来得出合理的结论。与美国的合理性原则分析相比，日本对回授条款考察更为细致、深入。
目前，世界上许多国家和地区已经对回授有了相当程度的认识，并通过其立法对回授作出必要的规定和限制，而作为发展中国家的我国，却仍没有对这一问题给予足够的重视和思考。实际上，作为科技水平相对落后的发展中国家，我国更有必要正确认识回馈授权，充分了解回授会对国内市场产生的负面影响，从而有效避免外国企业利用回授干涉国内企业进行自主研发，阻碍我国的科技进步。
由于我国立法对于回授进行规制的只有一些零散的、粗糙的规定，根本无法适应复杂的案件中适用法律的要求，而且现有的法律规范大多是适用于对外经济贸易活动中的行为，因此其适用范围十分有限。在对回馈授权进行规制的时候，立法者应综合借鉴美国、欧盟等国家和地区的立法和执法实践经验，通过反垄断立法来针对知识产权许可方面反竞争性的限制条款做出一般禁止性规定，并认可特殊条件下或有正当理由时的例外，从而既能充分保护经济竞争，又能实事求是地照顾到合理的暂时限制竞争的商业需要。同时，应由反垄断执法机关制定特定知识产权领域的反垄断行政规章或行为指南，将立法的稳定性和执法的灵活性有机结合起来。另外，反垄断立法应明确相应的程序规定，以便使竞争执法机关和知识产权与技术合同执法机关在处理此类案件时能密切配合，分工协作，从而及时有效地实施法律救济和法律制裁。在我国《反垄断法》还未出台的情况下，立法者应当积极利用《合同法》来矫正回馈授权，同时加快推出《反垄断法》。
所以，我国对于回馈授权的规制应当遵循保障创新与竞争的平衡发展、借鉴域外先进经验与适应我国国情相结合这两大原则，以反垄断法规制为主，以合同法规制为辅，充分发挥反垄断法和合同法各自的优势，以实现全面妥当的规制。
关键词：知识产权许可；回馈授权；竞争；反垄断法
Abstract
A grant-back arrangement in licensing agreement means that the patentee (licensor) requires the potential licensee to agree to grant back to the patentee rights to improvement patents developed by the licensee that relate to the original patent as partial consideration for the license rights.
There are two principal reasons for the inclusion of grant-backs in patent licensing agreements. First, a grant-back provision protects the licensor from being forced to compete with his licensees at a disadvantage by assuring future access to improvement patents developed by their licensees. Second, the parties may use grant-backs to maximize the overall efficiency of their relationship by ensuring a unified control over the entire process. Just as a large undeveloped tract of urban land is more valuable than the sum of its constituent parts, an entire patented process is more valuable than the aggregate value of the component patents. The parties may therefore negotiate a grant-back arrangement to achieve the win-win situation.
Grant-backs can have pro-competitive effects, especially if they are nonexclusive. Such arrangements provide a means for the licensee and the licensor to share risks and reward the licensor for making possible further innovation based on or informed by the licensed technology, and both promote innovation in the first place and promote the subsequent licensing of the results of the innovation. Grant-backs may adversely affect competition, however, if they substantially reduce the licensee’s incentives to engage in research and development and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.
The validity of grant-backs has been challenged under two theories. First, the grant-back arrangement has been challenged on the ground that it violates the public policy underlying the federal patent laws by enabling the patentee to expand the scope of his lawful patent monopoly. Second, individual grant-back has also been challenged as violative of the antitrust laws.
The question of the permissibility of the grant-back arrangement has been extensively discussed in Transparent-Wrap Mach. Corp. v. Stokes & Smith Co., commonly known as Transwrap. Although the validity of grant-backs has been at issue in many cases since Transwrap, the law on the subject has not been refined or reexamined during this period. Largely because of the context in which these cases have arisen, the courts have, for the most part, been content to reiterate the proposition that grant-backs are not unenforceable per se and have failed to scrutinize the validity issue with great care or effort. Recent developments cast doubt on the continuing vitality of Transwrap. More importantly, there have been indications during the past decade that the Justice Department believes that the decision in Transwrap should be modified significantly. The Justice Department's major objection to grant-backs appears to be the belief that such provisions stifle the licensee's innovation incentive. Since the effect of the grant-back on incentive is the major concern, the Justice Department has considered assignment-backs and exclusive license-backs to be per se antitrust violations as an element of its antitrust enforcement policy.
. According to the Antitrust Guidelines for the Licensing of Intellectual Property (1995), jointly issued by the Department of Justice and Federal Trade Commission:
“Grantbacks can have procompetitive effects, especially if they are nonexclusive.Such arrangements provide a means for the licensee and the licensor to share risks and reward the licensor for making possible further innovation based on or informed by the licensed technology, and both promote innovation in the first place and promote the subsequent licensing of the results of the innovation. Grantbacks may adversely affect competition, however, if they substantially reduce the licensee’s incentives to engage in research and development and thereby limit rivalry in innovation markets.”
In the application of the general principle to grantbacks, the agencies should first determine whether a particular grantback provision is likely to reduce significantly licensees’incentives to invest in improving the licensed technology. If the answer is affirmative, the agencies will consider the extent to which the grantback provision has offsetting procompetitive effects.
Key Words: intellectual property licensing; grant-back; competition; antitrust law
目 录
文章出处：本站原创